Putin’s no-show at the peace talks he asked for doesn’t mean it’s all over

For many, the biggest question surrounding planned peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul was whether Vladimir Putin would turn up. We now have the answer: he hasn’t.

Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, accused Russia of sending “stand-in props”. But absence may not be Putin’s final answer.

When the talks were first announced by Donald Trump a week ago, the Russian president – who had called for “direct talks, without pre-conditions” – had been directly challenged by Zelensky, who said he would be prepared to take part, but only if Putin was there in person.

Putin, for his part, had been non-committal. Contrary to some reports, he never said he would go but never said he wouldn’t, either. It was only when the composition of the Russian delegation was announced on the evening before that it was finally clear that he would be staying at home.

But there should be two qualifications.

It was always highly unlikely that Putin would take part in talks announced at such short notice. All national leaders – with the possible exception of Trump – expect a certain amount of preparation, in terms of protocol and substance, for any talks they take part in, especially outside their home country. Putin and the Kremlin always expect a great deal of groundwork, including lower-level preparatory talks – foreign minister level is usual in the latter stages – to have been done. That way, the whole agenda is pretty much wrapped up in advance, to avoid unwelcome surprises.

Putin is well aware of Zelensky’s gift for public relations and the widespread sympathy he enjoys abroad. All this would make him doubly wary of possible traps. The early call for a 30-day ceasefire on all fronts from Trump, which Zelensky reluctantly embraced, was one such.

It came as a surprise – and the Kremlin dislikes surprises intensely. Putin was never going to accept it without an undertaking that it would be accompanied by a halt to foreign weapons supplies to Ukraine, for fear that Ukraine would exploit any pause to strengthen its position: a suspicion, by the way, that is mutual.

All that said, Russia-Ukraine talks are scheduled to take place, albeit at a lower level – and could well make progress.

They have the blessing of the Nato secretary general, who met Turkey’s President Erdogan the day before, and there seems to be more of a general acceptance than there has been before that the war may be nearing its end. In the event of good progress in Istanbul, Trump’s hoped-for coup de théâtre might yet happen, with a joint Zelensky-Putin-Trump appearance. It seems improbable – but cannot be ruled out.

A second qualification concerns the level of the Russian delegation that has travelled to Istanbul, which has been criticised by, among others, the UK foreign secretary, David Lammy, for demeaning Zelensky. This is not completely fair. Zelensky himself was clearly preparing for all contingencies; he is in Ankara for a meeting with Erdogan, with the obvious option of transferring to Istanbul or not, depending on who arrived from Moscow.

The composition of the Russian delegation is mostly at deputy minister level. But that is the level that might be expected for what are, essentially, the first direct Russia-Ukraine talks since April 2022, which was less than two months after the Russian invasion and at a time when Russian troops were still threatening Kyiv.

It should also be recorded that these direct talks – at any level – represent more of a concession on Ukraine’s part than on Russia’s, with Kyiv moving in recent months from an absolute refusal to talk directly to Russia on any terms to Zelensky’s stated willingness to meet Putin in Istanbul.

But the key to the Russian team, and proof that Russia is taking the prospect of talks seriously, is that it is headed by Vladimir Medinsky.

He is described as a presidential aide with responsibilities mainly in the area of culture. However, Medinsky was the leader of the Russian side in March-April 2022, when it was widely reported that an agreement to end the war had been initialled, but which fell through at the last moment.

Why that happened is the subject of enormous contention. Whatever the reason, the war continued, Russia started to gain the upper hand, and any end to the war is now far, far more difficult to negotiate because of the additional losses, including the bloodshed, on either side.

What Russia would appear to be signalling in the composition of its delegation is that it sees this week’s Istanbul talks as an opportunity to pick up the process that was halted in April 2022. And that should not necessarily be bad news for Ukraine.

Even though Russia has made (some) gains of territory since then, Russia’s terms for an end to the war have barely changed. They include protection for Russian speakers in Ukraine (coded as an end to what Russia sees through a Second World War prism as Nazism), the incorporation of Ukraine’s four southeastern regions into Russia, acceptance of Russia’s de facto annexation of Crimea, and – what has always seemed to be the one non-negotiable condition – a veto on Ukraine’s membership of Nato, although eventual EU membership could be accepted.

Clearly, such conditions would be hard for Ukraine to accept, and leave Russia as a territorial beneficiary of its illegal war. But if these conditions were a just-about acceptable price of peace for Ukraine two years ago, they could perhaps form the basis of an end to the war now, when Russia is in a stronger position than it was.

Add an agreement by Russia to return the several thousand children that Ukraine says it has abducted – a charge that forms the basis of the ICC arrest warrants for Putin and Russia’s children’s commissioner – and there could be the seeds of an agreement that preserves Ukraine as an independent, sovereign and, if it so desires, Western-facing state.