Could these local elections change the party political landscape?

The 2025 local elections in England and Wales are of unusual significance. Things are volatile, but some trends are already very clear.

Coupled with the Runcorn by-election, they will show, in dramatic fashion, the increasing fragmentation of the British party system. Labour and the Conservatives are being challenged as never before on a national basis by the combined disruptive forces of Reform UK, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens – and in Wales and Scotland, the choices presented to the voters also include their respective nationalist parties, Plaid Cymru and the SNP.

This far exceeds any of the past dislocations to have affected the party system. What is going on?

Very. At the moment, according to the opinion polls, Labour and the Conservatives – combined – command about 45 to 50 per cent of the vote. At the last general election, the figure was 57.4 per cent. Compare that with previous challenges to the two main parties, when the old couple achieved combined totals of 67.3 per cent in 2010, 70 per cent in 1983, and 75.1 per cent in February 1974.

The now-disappearing two-party monopoly peaked at the 1951 election, when Labour and the Tories won 96.1 per cent of the vote (on a 82.6 per cent turnout). In many areas there is now a three-, four-, or even five-party system; and regional mayoralties will be won on less than 30 per cent of the vote (and only on the votes of, say, 10 or 15 per cent of the electorate as a whole).

Not all places hold elections, so the raw figures are misleading. So the key figures to watch will be the “Projected National Share” (PNS), taking account of areas not polling, calculated by John Curtice and published by the BBC.

The proximate reasons are obvious – 14 years of Conservative rule that ended with a decisive and historic rejection of that party, which would be difficult to recover from in a matter of months. The Labour Party won a landslide majority, but only based on about 34 per cent of the vote – historically low – while “difficult” decisions taken since then on tax and public spending have induced an early slump in their ratings.

The main beneficiary of this has been Reform UK, which continues to attract Conservative and ex-Conservative supporters; but the Greens and Lib Dems are also benefiting.

Focus-group research by More in Common reveals an extraordinary sense of frustration among the electorate with “Broken Britain” and the established parties – sometimes even extending to Reform UK and Nigel Farage (who’s been a politician longer than Keir Starmer and Kemi Badenoch combined).

The sense of malaise is almost universal – relating to the NHS, schools, living standards, housing, migration (regular and irregular), concerns (ill founded or not) about the cost and practicalities for households of net zero, such as needing to switch to heat pumps and electric cars; and there is a general feeling that no party has the answers.

It seems to go beyond the usual contempt in which politicians are held: both economic and “cultural” issues, and even some foreign policy matters (Trump, Ukraine) are now fuelling debates, which is highly unusual, historically. Pessimists conclude that faith in democracy itself is faltering.

This will be one of the most important factors, and a key indicator of that broad dissatisfaction with the status quo. Local elections usually don’t see a big turnout, especially this far away from a general election. Only about 60 per cent of the electorate voted at the July 2024 general election, and if turnout slumps to unusually low levels again now (say 20 to 25 per cent), that will suggest rising apathy.

The question is most crucial for Reform UK. Their voters (including supporters of predecessor outfits the Brexit Party and Ukip) traditionally tend to be less likely to go out and vote, but when they are sufficiently motivated, they can cause upsets – most remarkably in the 2016 EU referendum.

Reform UK voters are more likely to say they’re certain to vote – but will they defy the usual historical pattern? And will compulsory voter ID make a difference? Farage will be looking for some wins and a projected national vote share at least matching his party’s poll ratings – 25 per cent plus, with 30.5 per cent being the record for a Farage vehicle nationally (in the 2019 European elections for the Brexit Party).

On balance, the Tories and their leader Kemi Badenoch. She has put her excuses in early – they are defending a high base, she’s only been in office since November, and the 2024 defeat was shattering. Nonetheless, if the Tories score below 20 per cent (PNS) at time when the Labour administration is so unpopular and Farage is emerging as “the real opposition”, questions will be asked about her future.

Her putative opponents, however, will need to show how they could win back support from both Reform UK and the Liberal Democrats and Labour. Weekend chatter in Conservative associations may prove vital to her survival in the face of Robert Jenrick’s spirited shadow leadership campaign. “Unite the Right” is his (sotto voce) theme, but what about the centre?